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Abstract
One key problem in network analysis is the so-called influence maximization problem, which
consists in finding a set S of at most k seed users, in a social network, maximizing the spread of
information from S. This paper studies a related but slightly different problem: We want to find a set
S of at most k seed users that maximizes the spread of information, when S is added to an already
pre-existing – but unknown – set of seed users T . We consider such scenario to be very realistic.
Assume a central entity wants to spread a piece of news, while having a budget to influence k users.
This central authority may know that some users are already aware of the information and are going
to spread it anyhow. The identity of these users being however completely unknown.
We model this optimization problem using the Group Shapley value, a well-founded concept from
cooperative game theory. While the standard influence maximization problem is easy to approximate
within a factor 1− 1/e− ǫ for any ǫ > 0, assuming common computational complexity conjectures,
we obtain strong hardness of approximation results for the problem at hand in this paper. Maybemost
prominently, we show that it cannot be approximatedwithin 1/no(1) under the Gap Exponential Time
Hypothesis. Hence, it is unlikely to achieve anything better than a polynomial factor approximation.
Nevertheless, we show that a greedy algorithm can achieve a factor of 1−1/ek − ǫ for any ǫ > 0,
showing that not all is lost in settings where k is bounded.
1 INTRODUCTION
Node centrality and propagation of information or influence are two main topics in network analysis.
The former regards the problem of determining the most important nodes in a network according to
some measure of importance, while the latter studies mathematical models to represent how information
propagates in a communication network or how the influence of individuals spreads in a network.
In order to measure the centrality of nodes in a network a real-valued function, called centrality index,
associates a real number with each node that reflects its importance or criticality within the network. Most
of the centrality indices defined in the literature are based on graph-theoretical concepts and static graph
properties like distance (closeness, harmonic, and degree), spectral (page-rank or Katz), or path-based
(betweenness, coverage) properties. Modeling the spread of influence, instead, requires the combination
of a dynamic model for influence diffusion and a static model based on the network topology.
Chen and Teng [CT17] initiated the study of the interplay between spreading dynamics and network
centrality by defining two centrality indices based on dynamic models for influence diffusion: the single
node influence centrality, which measures the centrality of a node by its capability of spreading influence
when acting alone, and the Shapley centrality, which uses the Shapley value to measure the capability of
a node to increase the spreading capacity of a group of nodes.
In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value assesses the expected relevance of each player within a
subset of players (also called coalition), where the expectation is taken over all possible coalitions. More
formally, given a characteristic function τ that maps each coalition to the total payoff that this coalition
receives, the Shapley value of a player i can be understood as the expected payoff that i adds to any
coalition, w.r.t. function τ . The Shapley centrality index studied by Chen and Teng [CT17] measures the
centrality of a node by using the Shapley value and the spreading function σ as characteristic function.
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Most centrality indices neglect the relevance that coalitions of individuals and their coordination play
in social networks. For this reason, many centrality indices have been generalized to group centrality
indices which are real-valued functions over subsets of nodes instead of single nodes. Typically, a group
centrality index is fundamentally different from a combination of the individual centrality indices of the
nodes that compose the group, as it captures the relevance of the set as a whole, and not just as a sum of
individuals.
This paper extends the notion of influence-based Shapley centrality from single nodes to groups
of nodes by using the concept of the Group Shapley value. Our Influence-based Group Shapley (IGS)
centrality associates to a set S of nodes, the expected gain in influence that S adds to any pre-existing
seed set T . Notably, we investigate the problem of finding a set S of size at most k with highest IGS
value.
Interestingly, we believe that this way of evaluating the importance of a set of seed users is of high
interest from a practical viewpoint. Assume a central entity wants to spread a given piece of news, while
having a budget to influence a set of k users, at the same time knowing that already some users are
aware of the information and are going to spread it anyhow. The central entity, however, may have no
knowledge about who these users are. In this case, the central authority should target a set of seed users
with large IGS value.
Our contribution. We formalize the MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP problem of finding a set of seed nodes
with highest IGS centrality under a cardinality constraint and show how to compute a (1−ǫ)-approximate
value for the IGS centrality of a given set of nodes. Unfortunately, assuming common complexity theory
conjectures, we obtain strong hardness of approximation results for the MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP prob-
lem. Maybe most prominently, we show that it cannot be approximated within 1/no(1) under the Gap
Exponential Time Hypothesis. Hence, it is unlikely to achieve an approximation factor that is better than
a polynomial in n. Nevertheless, we show that a greedy algorithm achieves a factor of 1−1/ek − ǫ for any
ǫ > 0, showing that not all is lost in settings where k is bounded.
2 RELATEDWORK
There is a large literature about network centrality indices, see [New10, Ch. 7] for an introduction. Cen-
trality indices are usually categorized as distance-based (e.g., closeness centrality [Bav50]), path-based
(e.g., betweenness centrality [Fre77]), or spectral (e.g., page-rank [BP98]). Most of the literature fo-
cuses on defining indices for specific application domains (e.g., [Bav50, BP98, Fre77]), on the efficient
computation of the centrality index of each node or of the top-ranked nodes (e.g., [BBC+19, RU18]), or
on axiomatic characterization (e.g., [AT05, BV14]). Several centrality indices have been generalized to
group centrality indices [AvdGB+19, BGM18, CWW16, EB99, IETB12, MSS+18, ZLTG14, ZWL+17]
and to Shapley centrality [GGAM+03, MKS+13, SMR18, SMR16, TMRW18, TSM+18]. In all these
papers, the centrality indices are solely based on graph theoretical properties and do not take into account
dynamic models for influence spread.
Modeling spread of influence and information diffusion has also been widely investigated in the lit-
erature. One of the most studied problems is the so-called influence maximization problem: Given a
network and a budget k, find a set of k nodes, called seeds, to be the starters of an influence diffusion pro-
cess in such a way that the expected number of nodes that have been influenced at the end of the process
is maximized. The influence maximization problem has been introduced by Domingos and Richard-
son [DR01, RD02] and formalized as an optimization problem by Kempe et al. [KKT15]. Several work
followed these seminal papers, we refer the interest reader to [CLC13] and to the references in [KKT15].
In the literature on influence maximization, the influence capability of a set of seeds is modeled as a func-
tion σ: given a set S of seed nodes, σ(S) is the expected number of eventually influenced nodes. The
definition of σ depends on the model used to represent the spread of influence in the network, the two
most popular models being the Independent Cascade Model (ICM) and Linear Threshold Model (LTM),
see Section 3.2 for more details.
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As previously mentioned, Chen and Teng initiated studying the interplay of network centrality and
dynamic models for influence spread [CT17]. They introduced two centrality indices that are based on
the most commonly used models for influence diffusion. The first index is called Single Node Influence
(SNI) and measures the importance of a node v by its capability of influencing other nodes when v is the
only seed node, i.e., the SNI of v is σ({v}). The second index, called Shapley centrality, is computed
as the Shapley value of each node when the payoff function is σ. The authors presented an axiomatic
characterization of the proposed centrality indices, that is they presented five axioms and showed that the
Shapley centrality is the only index that satisfies all of them, while the SNI centrality is the only index
that satisfies a set of three different axioms. This characterization captures the differences between these
two indices: while SNI is suitable to model the centrality of a single node when it acts alone, the Shapley
centrality characterizes the additional influence of a single node when acting in a group. We remark that
our IGS centrality extends this latter concept by measuring the added value (in terms of influence) of a
group of nodes when it operates within a larger group. In the same paper, Chen and Teng proposed an
efficient algorithm to approximately compute SNI and Shapley centralities and experimentally evaluated
it on several real-world networks.
In a follow-up paper, Chen et al [CTZ18], presented a unified framework to extend classical graph-
theoretical centrality indices to influence based ones and group centrality indices to their Shapley influence-
based counterparts. They follow an axiomatic approach, that is, they show that the derived influence-
based centrality formulations are the unique centrality indices that conform with their corresponding
graph-theoretical ones and satisfy the Bayesian axiom. They also provide scalable algorithms to com-
pute influence-based centrality and Shapley centrality. We remark that also in this latter paper the aim is
to evaluate the centrality of a single node, while the focus of our paper is on evaluating the centrality of
a group of nodes.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we aim to connect cooperative game theory with influence maximization. Subsection 3.1
introduces the concept of the Group Shapley value as (arguably most popular) special case of probabilis-
tic generalized values in cooperative game theory. We then provide some observations on the Group
Shapley value that will turn out essential when we turn to its computation later on. Subsection 3.2 recalls
the basics needed from the influence maximization literature. Subsection 3.3 explains how the Group
Shapley value can be applied to the setting of influence maximization, we refer to it as Influence-based
Group Shapley (IGS) centrality in this case.
Throughout the paper, we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}, by 2S the set of all subsets of S, and by(S
k
)
the set of subsets of S of size k.
3.1 The Group Shapley Value
In cooperative game theory [CEW11, Mye13], a game on n ≥ 2 players is commonly formalized by
a characteristic function τ : 2[n] → R that assigns to every subset S ⊆ [n] of players, also called a
coalition, a value τ(S). Marichal et al. [MKF07] introduced the concepts of probabilistic generalized
values and generalized semivalues as ways of measuring the worth of a coalition S ⊆ [n]. Their notions
generalize the more classical concepts of probabilistic values and semivalues from individuals to groups
of individuals. That is, these values quantify the prospect of groups of players in a game. For fixed n, a
probabilistic generalized value of a coalition S ⊆ [n] in a game τ : 2[n] → R is of the form φτ (S) :=∑
T⊆[n]\S p
S
T · (τ(T ∪S)−τ(T )), where p
S denotes a probability distribution on the subsets T of [n]\S.
That is, generally speaking, a probabilistic generalized value quantifies the average marginal contribution
of the set S to any set T of players that is disjoint from S. Note that these marginal contributions
are assigned different probabilities pST . For fixed S, these probabilities can be understood as a-priori
likelihoods of sets T to be extended by S. A generalized semivalue is a probabilistic generalized value
such that pST = p
S′
T ′ if |S| = |S
′| and |T | = |T ′|.
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The arguably best known instance of generalized semivalues is the Group Shapley value [FMT19,
MKF07]. For a subset S ⊆ [n] of players in a game τ , the Group Shapley value of S is defined as
φShτ (S) :=
∑
T⊆[n]\S
|T |!(n − |S| − |T |)!
(n − |S|+ 1)!
· (τ(T ∪ S)− τ(T )),
i.e., it is the generalized semivalue for which pST =
1
n−|S|+1/
(n−|S|
|T |
)
. Stated otherwise, the set T can be
seen as a random variable chosen by first sampling an integer t ∈ {0, . . . , n− |S|} uniformly at random
and then picking a set of size t in [n] \ S uniformly at random.
The Group Shapley value is a generalization of the well-known Shapley value [Sha53], which quan-
tifies the contribution of a single player to a coalition in a game. The standard Shapley value of a
player i w.r.t. τ can simply be defined as the Group Shapley value of the singleton set {i}, that is
φShτ (i) := φ
Sh
τ ({i}). It is well known that, using a standard counting argument, this definition is equiva-
lent to φShτ (i) := Eπ[τ(Tπ,i ∪ {i}) − τ(Tπ,i)], where π ∼ Π([n]) is a permutation of [n] that is picked
uniformly at random among all permutations Π([n]) of [n] and Tπ,i denotes the set of players in [n]
ordered before i in π. A similar formulation in terms of permutations can also be obtained for the Group
Shapley value. Let us first introduce the following notation: For a set X ⊆ [n], letXS := (X \S)∪{sˆ},
where sˆ is an auxiliary item representing all the items from S.1
Observation 1 (Group Shapley formulation using permutations). The Group Shapley value of a set S in
a game τ is equal to
φShτ (S) = Eπ∼Π([n]S)[τ(Tπ,sˆ ∪ S)− τ(Tπ,sˆ)],
where Tπ,sˆ is the subset of [n] \ S preceding sˆ in the permutation π of [n]S picked uniformly at random
from Π([n]S).
Proof. Consider the game τˆ defined on [n]S by τˆ(T ) = τ(T ) if sˆ 6∈ T and τˆ(T ) = τ((T \ {sˆ}) ∪ S)
otherwise. Then Observation 1 follows from the fact that the Shapley value of sˆ in τˆ coincides with the
Group Shapley value of S in τ .
We proceed with the following observation on the probability that a given set R intersects with a
set T chosen according to probabilities pST for the Group Shapley value. This observation relies on the
Group Shapley formulation using the permutations.
Observation 2 (Intersection Probability for the Group Shapley Value). Let S ⊆ [n] be a group. For any
R ⊆ [n] with R ∩ S 6= ∅, it holds that Prπ∼Π([n]
S
)[RS ∩ Tπ,sˆ = ∅] = 1/(|R \ S|+ 1), where Tπ,sˆ is the
subset of [n] preceding sˆ in the random permutation π of [n]S .
Proof. The eventRS∩Tπ,sˆ = ∅ is equivalent to the permutation π of [n]S placing sˆ ahead of all the other
nodes in RS . Since π is sampled uniformly at random from Π([n]S), this event happens with probability
exactly 1/|RS | = 1/(|R \ S|+ 1).
3.2 Influence Maximization
We will be interested in Generalized Semivalues for functions that describe influence on information
propagation in social networks. Two of the most popular models for describing information propagation
in networks are the Independent Cascade and Linear Threshold models [KKT15]. In both of these
models, we are given a directed graph G = (V,E) where V is a set of n nodes, values {puv ∈ [0, 1] :
(u, v) ∈ E} and an initial node setA ⊆ V called seed nodes. A spread of influence from the setA is then
defined as a randomly generated sequence of node sets (At)t∈N, where A0 = A and At−1 ⊆ At. These
sets represent active users, i.e., we say that a node v is active at time step t if v ∈ At. This sequence
converges as soon as At∗ = At∗+1, for some time step t∗ ≥ 0 called the time of quiescence. For a set
1Flores et al. [FMT19] define the so-called merging game on VS . Considering games that result by merging players is quite
common, see for example the work of Lehrer [Leh88].
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A, we use σ(A) = E[|At∗ |] to denote the expected number of nodes activated at the time of quiescence
when running the process with seed nodes A. In influence maximization, a common objective is to find
a set A maximizing σ(A) under a cardinality constraint.
The Independent Cascade Model. In the Independent Cascade (IC) model, the values {puv ∈ [0, 1] :
(u, v) ∈ E} are probabilities. The sequence of node sets (At)t∈N, is randomly generated as follows. If
u is active at time step t ≥ 0 but was not active at time step t − 1, i.e., u ∈ At \ At−1 (with A−1 = ∅),
it tries to activate each of its neighbors v, independently, and succeeds with probability puv. In case of
success, w becomes active at time step t+ 1, i.e., v ∈ At+1.
The Linear Threshold Model. In the Linear Threshold (LT) model, the values {puv ∈ [0, 1] : (u, v) ∈
E} are weights such that for each node v,
∑
(u,v)∈E puv ≤ 1. The sequence of node sets (At)t∈N, is
randomly generated as follows. At time step t+1, every inactive node v such that
∑
(u,v)∈E,u∈At
puv ≥
θv becomes active, i.e., v ∈ At+1, where thresholds θv are chosen independently and uniformly at
random from the interval [0, 1].
The Triggering Model. The IC and LT models can be generalized to what is known as the Triggering
Model, see [KKT15, Proofs of Theorem 4.5 and 4.6]. For a node v ∈ V , let Nv denote all in-neighbors
of v. In the Triggering model, every node independently picks a triggering set Tv ⊆ Nv according to
some distribution over subsets of its in-neighbors. For a possible outcome X = (Tv)v∈V of triggering
sets for the nodes in V , letGX = (V,E′) denote the sub-graph ofG where E′ = {(u, v)|v ∈ V, u ∈ Tv}.
Moreover, let ρX(A) be the set of nodes reachable from A in GX , then σ(A) = EX [|ρX(A)|]. The
IC model is obtained from the Triggering model if for each directed edge (u, v), u is added to Tv with
probability puv. Differently, the LT model is obtained if each node v picks at most one of its in-neighbor
to be in her triggering set, selecting a node u with probability puv and selecting no one with probability
1−
∑
u∈Nv
puv.
Interestingly, the Triggering Model allows for using a concept commonly referred to as reverse reach-
able sets.
Reverse Reachable (RR) Sets. We describe the process of generating so-called Reverse Reachable
(RR) sets [BBCL14, TXS14]. A random RR set R is generated as follows [CT17]. (1) Set R = ∅. (2)
Uniformly at random select a root node v ∈ V and add it toR. (3) Until every node in R has a triggering
set: Pick a node u from R that does not have a triggering set, sample its triggering set Tu and add it to
R. A random RR set R can be equivalently generated as all nodes that can reach a uniformly at random
sampled root node v in a random graph GX sampled as in the Triggering Model [BBCL14]. We get
the following lemma for the marginal contribution of a set, the lemma generalizes Lemma 22 in [CT17]
from marginal contribution of nodes to sets of nodes.
Lemma 3 (Marginal Contribution). Let R be a random RR set. For any T ⊆ V and S ⊆ V \ T :
σ(T ) = n · Pr
R
[R ∩ T 6= ∅],
and σ(T ∪ S)− σ(T ) = n · Pr
R
[R ∩ S 6= ∅ ∧R ∩ T = ∅].
Proof. LetX be a random outcome profile in the triggering model and let ρX(S) denote the set of nodes
reachable from S in GX . Then
σ(T ) = EX [|ρX(T )|] = EX [
∑
v∈V
1v∈ρX (T )]
= n · EX [Ev∼V [1v∈ρX (T )]] = n · PrX,v∼V
[v ∈ ρX(T )].
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Recall that a random RR set is equivalently generated as all nodes that can reach a uniformly at random
sampled root node v in a random outcome graph GX . Hence, the above event is equivalent to R∩T 6= ∅
and the first claim follows. Similarly, we have
σ(T ∪ S)− σ(T ) = EX [|ρX(T ∪ S) \ ρX(T )|]
= n · EX [Eu∼V [1u∈ρX(T∪S)\ρX (T )]]
= n · Pr
X,u∼V
[u ∈ ρX(T ∪ S) \ ρX(T )].
By a similar argument, the event u ∈ ρX(T ∪S)\ρX(S) is equivalent to the eventR∩S 6= ∅∧R∩T = ∅.
This shows the second claim.
3.3 The Group Shapley Centrality
Chen and Teng [CT17] consider the Shapley value of nodes w.r.t. the influence spread function σ in
a social network modeled by the Triggering Model. They use the resulting Shapley centrality φShσ (i)
for i being a node in the network as a measure of centrality of node i. They furthermore show that
this centrality measure satisfies and is uniquely characterized by certain axioms, similar to the axioms
characterizing the standard Shapley value. In this work, we consider the Group Shapley value w.r.t. σ.
For a set S of nodes, we call the Group Shapley value w.r.t. σ the Influence-based Group Shapley (IGS)
centrality of S, referred to as φSh(S) omitting σ as an index:
φSh(S) = Eπ∼Π(V
S
)[σ(Tπ,s ∪ S)− σ(Tπ,s)]. (1)
One of the main contributions of Chen and Teng [CT17] is an algorithm that approximates the Shap-
ley centrality of every node. The key lemma in their analysis is that for a node v ∈ V , it holds that
φShσ (v) = nER[1v∈R/|R|], where the expected value is over random RR sets generated as described
above. For the IGS centrality φSh(S) of a set S, we show the following analogous lemma.
Lemma 4 (IGS centrality via RR sets). Let S ⊆ V , it holds that φSh(S) = n · ER[
1R∩S 6=∅
|R\S|+1 ].
Proof. For the IGS centrality, it holds that
φSh(S) = Eπ∼Π(V
S
)[σ(Tπ,s ∪ S)− σ(Tπ,s)]
= Eπ∼Π(V
S
)[n · Pr
R
(R ∩ S 6= ∅ ∧R ∩ Tπ,s = ∅)]
= n · ER[Eπ∼Π(V
S
)[1R∩S 6=∅∧R∩Tpi,s=∅]]
= n · ER
[
1R∩S 6=∅
|R \ S|+ 1
]
,
using Lemma 3 and Observation 2.
Consequently from this lemma, we obtain that the IGS centrality is a monotonously increasing set
function. Furthermore, Lemma 4 provides the following observation on the range of IGS centralities.
Observation 5 (Range of IGS Centralities). Let S∗ be a set of size k maximizing φSh. Then φSh(S∗) ≥ 1.
Moreover, φSh(S) ≥ kn for any S ⊆ V of size k. Lastly, φ
Sh(S) ≤ n for any S and φSh(V ) = n.
Proof. According to the normalization axiom of the Shapley value (for single items), we have
∑
i∈V φ
Sh({i}) =
n, hence there is a node i0 for which φSh({i0}) ≥ 1. Since φSh is a monotonously increasing set func-
tion, it holds that φSh(S) ≥ 1 for any set S of size k containing i0, thus also φSh(S∗) ≥ 1. In order to
show that φSh(S) ≥ kn for any S ⊆ V \ ∅ of size k. With R(u,X) we denote the RR set sampled from a
node u for an outcome profile X. We then observe that, according to Lemma 4, φSh(S) equals
n · ER
[
1R∩S 6=∅
|R \ S|+ 1
]
≥ n ·
1
n
·
∑
v∈S
EX
[ 1R(v,X)∩S 6=∅
|R(v,X) \ S|+ 1
]
≥
k
n
,
using that |R(v,X) \ S| ≤ n − 1 as v ∈ S. The remaining claims follow analogously using the same
equality from Lemma 4.
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Our ultimate goal would be to find a set S of size at most k with highest IGS centrality among all
such sets. This is formalized below.
MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP
Input: Influence maximization instance on digraph G, integer k.
Find: S ⊆ V s.t. |S| ≤ k, maximizing φSh(S).
The naive approach for solving the optimization problem MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP would be to evaluate
φSh for all subsets of size at most k and pick the one with highest value. Unfortunately, the formula for
computing φSh for a single set S given in Equation 1 is already not practical as it requires to compute
the difference σ(S ∪ T ) − σ(T ) for an exponential number of sets T . Alternatively, one could try to
follow an approach similar to the one taken by Chen and Teng [CT17] for the Shapley centrality of single
nodes. Such approach for IGS centrality however would require updating O(nk) estimates (one for each
candidate set) in every iteration. We will see later on in Section 5 how to avoid this taking a different
route. In the next section, we focus on overcoming the first difficulty, i.e., we show how to approximate
IGS centrality. The approach relies on the representation of φSh given in Lemma 4 and, non-surprisingly,
on a Chernoff bound.
4 EVALUATING IGS CENTRALITY
This section is concerned with the question of estimating the function φSh. We first give a straightforward
result that shows how to compute φSh(S) for a given set S. Thereafter, we show that by sampling a
sufficient number of RR sets, we can give a set function φˆSh that with high probability approximates φSh
in a sense that suffices for obtaining an approximation algorithm for MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP. The main
tool for this section is the following classical Chernoff bound that can be found in the survey by Chung
and Lu [CL06, Theorem 4] or in Appendix C.2 of the full version of Chen and Teng’s paper [CT17].
Fact 6 (Chernoff Bound). Let Y be the sum of t i.i.d. random variables with mean µ and value range
[0, 1].
1. For any α ∈ (0, 1), we have Pr[Yt − µ ≤ −αµ] ≤ exp(−
α2
2 tµ).
2. For any α > 0, we have Pr[Yt − µ ≥ αµ] ≤ exp(−
α2
2+ 2
3
α
tµ).
Approximately Evaluating φSh(S). In this paragraph, we show that using the above Chernoff bound
we can, in a straightforward way, obtain a (1 ± ǫ)-approximation φ˜Sh(S) of φSh(S) for any set S ⊆ V
and ǫ ∈ (0, 1) by sampling Θ(n2ǫ−2 log n) RR sets.
Lemma 7. Let S ⊆ V and ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let R1, . . . , Rt be a sequence of t ≥ 6n
2ǫ−2c log(n) RR sets for
some constant c ≥ 2. Then, with probability at least 1 − n−c, it holds that φ˜Sh(S) := nt
∑t
i=1
1Ri∩S 6=∅
|Ri\S|+1
satisfies |φ˜Sh(S)− φSh(S)| < ǫ · φSh(S).
Proof. If S = ∅, the statement trivially holds. Otherwise, define the random variables Yi(S) :=
1Ri∩S 6=∅
|Ri\S|+1
∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ [t] and let Y (S) :=
∑t
i=1 Yi(S) as well as µ(S) := E[Yi(S)]. Clearly,
µ(S) = φSh(S)/n by Lemma 4 and φ˜Sh(S) = nt Y (S). Thus Pr[|φ˜
Sh(S) − φSh(S)| ≥ ǫ · φSh(S)]
equals
Pr
[∣∣∣Y (S)
t
− µ(S)
∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ · µ(S)] ≤ 2 exp (− ǫ2
3
· tµ(S)
)
using Fact 6 and ǫ ≤ 1. We lower bound µ(S) = φ(S)/n ≥ 1/n2 using Observation 5. The choice of t
leads to the bound of n−c.
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An Approximate Characterization φˆSh of φSh. Lemma 7 is unsatisfactory for the following reason.
It samples a number of RR sets that is quadratic in the number of nodes n even for evaluating the IGS
centrality of a single group. In this paragraph, we show how to circumvent this problem. We show that
a near-linear number of RR sets suffices to compute, for any set S, an approximation φˆSh(S) of φSh(S)
that is good enough for giving an approximation algorithm for MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP. More precisely,
we define a function φˆSh that meets the following two conditions: (1) For any set S of size k, φˆSh(S)
does not overestimate φSh(S) too much and (2) For an optimal set S∗, φˆSh(S∗) does not underestimate
φSh(S∗) too much. We will show that these conditions suffice for a set S that is close to being optimal
for φˆSh to also be close to being optimal for φSh.
Theorem 8. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and R1, . . . , Rt be a sequence of RR sets of length t ≥ 6nǫ
−2(c+ k) log(n)
for some constant c ≥ 2. Let S∗ be a set of size at most k maximizing φSh and let
φˆSh(S) :=
n
t
t∑
i=1
1Ri∩S 6=∅
|Ri \ S|+ 1
for each set S ∈
(
V
k
)
.
Then, with probability at least 1− n−c, the following conditions hold.
(1) φˆSh(S)− φSh(S) < ǫ · φSh(S∗), for all S ∈
(V
k
)
.
(2) φˆSh(S∗)− φSh(S∗) > −ǫ · φSh(S∗).
Proof. We first show that (1) holds with probability at least 1 − 12n
−c. Let S ∈
(V
k
)
. Define the
random variables Yi(S) :=
1Ri∩S 6=∅
|Ri\S|+1
∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ [t] and let Y (S) :=
∑t
i=1 Yi(S) as well as
µ(S) := E[Yi(S)]. Clearly, µ(S) = φSh(S)/n by Lemma 4 and φˆSh(S) = nt Y (S). Let α :=
ǫφSh(S∗)
φSh(S)
.
Then, Pr[φˆSh(S)− φSh(S) ≥ ǫ · φSh(S∗)] equals
Pr
[Y (S)
t
− µ(S) ≥ α ·
φSh(S)
n
]
≤ exp
(
−
α2
2 + 23α
· tµ(S)
)
,
using Fact 6. Using the definition of α, we get that the argument of exp is equal to− ǫ
2φSh(S∗)
2φSh(S)/φSh(S∗)+2ǫ/3
·
t
n ≤ −
ǫ2φSh(S∗)
3n · t using that ǫ < 1 and φ
Sh(S) ≤ φSh(S∗). Using that φSh(S∗) ≥ 1 according to
Observation 5 and the definition of t lead to the upper bound of 1/n2(c+k). A union bound over all at
most nk sets in
([n]
k
)
shows that φˆSh(S)− φSh(S) ≥ ǫ · φSh(S∗) holds for every such S with probability
at most nk · n−2(c+k) ≤ 12 · n
−c.
We proceed to condition (2). It holds that Pr[φˆSh(S∗)− φSh(S∗) ≤ −ǫ · φSh(S∗)] is equal to
Pr
[Y (S∗)
t
− µ(S∗) ≤ −ǫ ·
φSh(S∗)
n
]
≤ exp
(
−
ǫ2
2
· tµ(S∗)
)
using Fact 6 with α = ǫ. Furthermore, µ(S∗) = φSh(S∗)/n and again φSh(S∗) ≥ 1 as well as the
definition of t yield that φˆSh(S∗) − φSh(S∗) ≤ −ǫ · φSh(S∗) holds with probability at most 12 · n
−c. A
union bound over the probabilities that (1) or (2) do not hold, concludes the proof.
In the next section, we investigate how to find an approximation algorithm for the MAX-SHAPLEY-
GROUP problem without computing the centralities of all sets of size k.
5 FINDING GROUPS OF LARGE IGS CENTRALITY
To address the MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP problem, Theorem 8 suggests the following approach. Sample
a near-linear number t of RR sets and compute a set of nodes S that maximizes φˆSh(S). We formalize
this problem as a variant of the well known MAX-HITTING-SET problem, that we call the HARMONIC-
MAX-HITTING-SET problem.
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HARMONIC-MAX-HITTING-SET
Input: set X = {x1, . . . , xn}, set Z = {Z1, . . . , Zm} of subsets
of X, integer k.
Find: S ⊆ X s.t. |S| ≤ k maximizing fZ(S) :=
∑m
i=1
1Zi∩S 6=∅
|Zi\S|+1
.
It is a non-linear variant of the well-known MAX-HITTING-SET problem (which is itself equivalent to
the MAX-SET-COVER problem [GJ02]) in which the objective function is
∑m
i=1 1Zi∩S 6=∅.
The problem of maximizing the previously defined function φˆSh can be stated as a HARMONIC-MAX-
HITTING-SET problem by letting X be the set V of nodes in graph G and Z be the set of generated
RR sets. The connection between the HARMONIC-MAX-HITTING-SET and MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP
problems from an approximation algorithm’s perspective is made more formal in the next lemma.
Lemma 9. Let α ∈ (0, 1], ǫ ∈ (0, 1), c ≥ 2 and k ∈ [n]. Let Sα be an α-approximate solution
for the HARMONIC-MAX-HITTING-SET problem with budget k, X = V and Z = {R1, . . . , Rt} s.t.
t ≥ 24nǫ−2(c + k) log(n) RR sets. Then, Sα is an (α − ǫ)-approximation for MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP
with probability at least 1− n−c.
Proof. Let ǫ′ = ǫ/2. By Theorem 8, we have that φˆSh(S) − φSh(S) < ǫ′ · φSh(S∗) for all S ∈
([n]
k
)
and φˆSh(S∗) − φSh(S∗) > −ǫ′ · φSh(S∗) hold with probability at least 1 − n−c, where φˆSh(S) :=∑t
i=1
n·1Ri∩S 6=∅
t·(|Ri\S|+1)
. Let S∗ (resp. Sˆ∗) be a set of size k maximizing φSh (resp. φˆSh). Then with probability
at least 1− n−c, it holds that
φSh(Sα) + ǫ
′ · φSh(S∗) ≥ φˆSh(Sα) ≥ α · φˆ
Sh(Sˆ∗)
≥ α · φˆSh(S∗) ≥ α · (φSh(S∗)− ǫ′ · φSh(S∗)),
where we have used that φˆSh(Sα) ≥ α · φˆSh(Sˆ∗) as φˆSh(·) = nt fZ(·). The choice of ǫ
′ and α ≤ 1 yield
α− αǫ′ − ǫ′ ≥ α− ǫ. Thus φSh(Sα) ≥ (α− ǫ) · φSh(S∗) with probability at least 1− n−c.
Approximation Algorithm. In this section, we describe a 1−1/ek approximation algorithm for the
HARMONIC-MAX-HITTING-SET problem. Consider an instance (X,Z, k) and define the following
set function hZ(S) :=
∑m
i=1 1Zi∩S 6=∅/|Zi|. Note the similarity between hZ and fZ . In fact, the ap-
proximation algorithm that we propose is to greedily maximize hZ instead of fZ . Why would this be a
good idea? (1) The set function hZ is monotone and submodular; thus the greedy algorithm will yield a
1− 1/e approximation to maximizing hZ . (2) Given a set S ⊆ X with |S| ≤ k, it holds that
fZ(S) ≥ hZ(S) ≥ fZ(S)/k, (2)
that is, the error when considering hZ instead of fZ is bounded by k. Hence, if we denote by S∗f (resp. S
∗
h)
an optimal solution of size k for maximizing fZ (resp. hZ ), we have that hZ(S∗h) ≥ hZ(S
∗
f ) ≥ fZ(S
∗
f )/k.
Now let S be the solution of size k returned by the greedy algorithm. Then, S is a 1−1/ek approximation
to maximizing fZ as
fZ(S) ≥ hZ(S) ≥
(
1−
1
e
)
· hZ(S
∗
h) ≥
1− 1/e
k
· fZ(S
∗
f ).
It remains to prove the inequalities in (2).
Proof of Inequalities in (2). We note that, for any S, fZ(S) equals
m∑
i=1
1Zi∩S 6=∅
|Zi \ S|+ 1
=
m∑
i=1
|Zi|
|Zi| − |Zi ∩ S|+ 1
1Zi∩S 6=∅
|Zi|
. (3)
The left inequality in (2) follows since |Zi| ≥ |Zi| − |Zi ∩ S|+ 1, if Zi ∩ S 6= ∅. Next, we observe that
|Zi|
|Zi|−|Zi∩S|+1
= 1+ |Zi∩S|−1|Zi|−|Zi∩S|+1 and, if S is of size k, |Zi ∩S| ≤ k. Together with |Zi| − |Zi∩S| ≥ 0,
we obtain |Zi||Zi|−|Zi∩S|+1 ≤ k. The right inequality in (2) follows.
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Using Lemma 9, we thus obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and c ≥ 2. Using Θ(nkǫ−2 log n) RR sets, we can obtain a 1−1/ek − ǫ
approximation to the MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP problem with probability at least 1− n−c.
We conclude this paragraph with a note on an alternative approach for an approximation algorithm
with a similar ratio but worse dependency on the number of generated RR sets. Define the function
h(S) := n · ER[
1R∩S 6=∅
|R| ]. Note that φ
Sh(S) ≥ h(S) ≥ φSh(S)/k holds following a proof analogous
to the one of (2). Clearly, h is a monotone and submodular set function (just as hZ is) and it can be
approximated within a 1 ± ǫ factor for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) in an analogous way as used in Lemma 7. Thus
the greedy algorithm can be used in order to maximize h to within a 1 − 1/e − ǫ factor subject to the
cardinality constraint. Altogether, we obtain the approximation ratio of 1−1/e−ǫk which is comparable to
what is achieved by Theorem 10. However the required number of RR sets in every step of the k steps
of this greedy naive approach is quadratic in the number of nodes.
While Theorem 10 provides an interesting result for small k values, it remains unsatisfactory for large
k. One could hope for a much stronger result as for example constant-factor approximations. Unfortu-
nately, this is unlikely as we will see in the following section, where we provide several approximation
hardness results for the MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP problem.
6 HARDNESS OF APPROXIMATION
In this section, we show that MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP under the IC model is, up to a constant factor, as
hard to approximate as DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH. More precisely, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 11. Let α ∈ (0, 1]. If there is an α-approximation algorithm for MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP,
then there is an α/8-approximation algorithm for DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH.
A number of strong hardness of approximation results are known for DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH. We
review some of them: (1) DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH cannot be approximated within 1/no(1) if the Gap
Exponential Time Hypothesis (Gap-ETH) holds [Man17]. (2) DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH cannot be ap-
proximated within any constant if the Unique Games with Small Set Expansion conjecture holds [RS10].
(3) DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH cannot be approximated within n−(log logn)
−c
for some constant c if the Ex-
ponential Time Hypothesis holds [Man17]. Using the reduction given in this section, we obtain the same
hardness results also for MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP. In particular, we would like to stress that, according
to (1) and our reduction, it is unlikely to find anything better than an (n−c)-approximation for MAX-
SHAPLEY-GROUP, where c is a constant. Furthermore, for all settings where k = O(nc), such an algo-
rithm is implied by our result in Section 5. We proceed by formally defining DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH.
DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH
Input: Undirected graph G = (V,E), integer k.
Find: set T ⊆ V with |T | ≤ k, s.t. |E[T ]| is maximum. Here E[T ]
are the edges induced by T , i.e. E[T ] := {e ∈ E : e ⊆ T}.
The reduction. Let us fix an an instance P = (G = (V,E), k) of DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH. Note that,
w.l.o.g., we can assume that G is connected.2 From P, we create the following MAX-SHAPLEY-GROUP
2It is not hard to show that from anα-approximation algorithm for connected graphs, we can obtain an (α/2)-approximation
algorithm for general graphs by making the graph connected and then applying the approximation algorithm as follows. Let
us assume that G is disconnected, and there are ν connected components, we construct a graph Gˆ = (V, Eˆ) by adding ν − 1
edges to E in order to make the graph connected. Let Tˆ be a solution returned by an approximation algorithm for connected
graphs on Gˆ. If Tˆ contains both nodes at the endpoints of an edge in Eˆ \ E, we can compute a solution T for G by iteratively
substituting each pair of nodes in Tˆ that do not induce an edge in G with two nodes that are adjacent inG. It is easy to see that
|E[T ]| is at least 1
2
|Eˆ[Tˆ ]|, where Eˆ[Tˆ ] are the edges induced by Tˆ in Gˆ: for each edge e = (u, v) in Eˆ[Tˆ ] \ E either there
exists an edge in E[T ] that is incident to u or v, or u and v are substituted with two nodes that are adjacent in G. Moreover,
|Eˆ[Tˆ ]| ≥ α|Eˆ[Tˆ ∗]| ≥ α|E[T ∗]|, where Tˆ ∗ and T ∗ are optimal solution for G and Gˆ, respectively.
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instance P = (G = (V ,A), {pa}a∈A, k): (1) Probabilities pa are set to 1 for all a ∈ A. (2) We set
the budget to k := k · t, where t := 6|E|. (3) The node set is defined as V := V V ∪ V E , where
V V := {u
v
1, . . . , u
v
t |v ∈ V } and V E := {u
e
1, . . . , u
e
ℓ |e ∈ E} for ℓ := (2t + 1)t|V | + 1. (4) The arc set
A is defined as follows: for each edge {v, v′} ∈ E, we create a pattern in G as described in Figure 1.
This pattern is composed of three layers. Two layers, called v-layer and v′-layer, gathering all the nodes
in {uv1, . . . , u
v
t } and {u
v′
1 , . . . , u
v′
t } respectively and one layer called, {v, v
′}-layer, gathering all nodes
in {u{v,v
′}
1 , . . . , u
{v,v′}
ℓ }. There is an arc from each node of the first two layers to each node of the third
layer.
uv1 u
v
2 · · · u
v
t v-layer
uv
′
1 u
v′
2
· · · uv
′
t v
′-layer
u
{v,v′}
1 u
{v,v′}
2
· · · u
{v,v′}
ℓ−1 u
{v,v′}
ℓ
{v, v′}-layer
Figure 1: Pattern obtained in G for each edge {v, v′} ∈ E.
RR sets for P. Interestingly, all RR sets that can be generated in P are easily described as two different
types: (1) RR-sets that consist of singletons {uvp}, we call them Node-RR-sets and denote the set of
all Node-RR-sets by RV . There is exactly one Node-RR-set per node uvp ∈ V V . (2) RR-sets of the
form {u{v,v
′}
p , uv1, . . . , u
v
t , u
v′
1 , . . . , u
v′
t }, we call them Edge-RR-sets and denote the set of all Edge-RR-
sets by RE . There is exactly one Edge-RR-set per node u
{v,v′}
p ∈ V E . We note that each RR-set
occurs with the same probability 1/V . Hence, the IGS centrality of a set S ⊆ V , can be written as
φSh(S) = φShV (S) + φ
Sh
E (S), where φ
Sh
V (S) :=
∑
R∈RV
1R∩S 6=∅
|R\S|+1 and φ
Sh
E (S) :=
∑
R∈RE
1R∩S 6=∅
|R\S|+1 .
We proceed with a simple observation. For a node u ∈ V and a set S ⊆ V \ {u}, we denote by
I(u, S) := φSh(S ∪ {u}) − φSh(S) the increase in IGS centrality obtained from adding u to S.
Observation 12. Let u ∈ V and S ⊆ V \ {u}. If u ∈ V V , then I(u, S) ≥ 1. If u ∈ V E , then
I(u, S) ≤ 1/2.
The proof of the above observation is simple. The first part holds due to the contribution of the Node-
RR-set corresponding to u itself, the second part holds as u is in only one Edge-RR-set R of size 2t+ 1,
thus
1R∩(S∪{u}) 6=∅
|R\(S∪{u})|+1 −
1R∩S 6=∅
|R\S|+1 ≤
1
2 . Hence, we can say that a “reasonable” solution for P only contains
nodes from V V .
Thorough Sets. We introduce some notation. For S ⊆ V V and v ∈ V , we define #S(v) := |S ∩
{uv1, . . . , u
v
t }|, US := {v ∈ V : #S(v) ≥ 1}, and U
(1,t)
S := {v ∈ US : #S(v) ∈ (1, t)}. Note that
US, U
(1,t)
S ⊆ V . The following notion is central to our analysis.
Definition 13. We call a set S ⊆ V V to be thorough, if (1) #S′′(v) = t for all v ∈ US and (2)
|E[US ]| ≥ 1.
Now, let S∗ and T ∗ be optimal solutions for P and P, respectively. We get the following lemma, part
(3) of which shows how to transform a thorough set S into a solution of P in a straightforward way.
Lemma 14. It holds that (1) φSh(S∗) ≥ ℓ2 |E[T
∗]|, (2) for all S ⊆ V V , we have φ
Sh
E (S) ≥ φ
Sh(S)/2,
and (3) if S ⊆ V V is thorough, we have φ
Sh
E (S) ≤ ℓ|E[US ]|.
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Proof. For (1), we let ST ∗ :=
⋃
v∈T ∗{u
v
i }i∈[t] and get φ
Sh(S∗) ≥ φSh(ST ∗) ≥ φ
Sh
E (ST ∗). As each edge
in E[T ∗] induces l Edge-RR-sets R with |R \ ST ∗ | = 1, we have φShE (ST ∗) ≥
ℓ
2 |E[T
∗]|.
For (2), fix S ⊆ V V . AsG is connected, for any u ∈ V V , there are at least l Edge-RR-sets containing
u. Hence, φShE (S) ≥
ℓ
2t+1 . On the other hand, note that φ
Sh
V (S) ≤ t|V |. As ℓ > (2t + 1)t|V |, we get
φShE (S) ≥ φ
Sh
V (S) and hence φ
Sh
E (S) ≥
φSh(S)
2 .
For (3), let S ⊆ V V be a thorough set. Define Ei := {e ∈ E : e ∩ US = i} for i = 1, 2. Clearly,
E[US ] = E2 and, for each edge in E1 (resp. E2) there are exactly ℓ Edge-RR-sets R with |R \S| = t+1
(resp. |R \ S| = 1). Hence, we conclude that φShE (S) =
ℓ|E2|
2 +
ℓ|E1|
t+2 ≤ ℓ|E2| by the choice of t.
In Lemmata 15 and 16 below, we show that every solution S ⊆ V V of P can be transformed in
polynomial time into a feasible thorough set S′′ with φShE (S
′′) ≥ φShE (S). This allows us to prove
Theorem 11.
Proof of Theorem 11. Let S be an α approximate solution for P. We can assume, w.l.o.g., that S ⊆ V V .
Using (2) and (1) of Lemma 14, we get φShE (S) ≥
φSh(S)
2 ≥
α
2φ
Sh(S∗) ≥ αℓ4 |E[T
∗]|. We now apply
Lemmata 15 and 16 to the set S, obtaining a thorough set S′′. Together with Lemma 14 (3), we get
φShE (S) ≤ φ
Sh
E (S
′′) ≤ ℓ|E[US′′ ]|. Thus, S′′ is an
α
4 -approximaion for P. If G is disconnected, this adds
an extra 1/2 to the approximation ratio. This concludes the proof.
Transforming S ⊆ V V into a Thorough Set. Let S ⊆ V V be a set of size k. We transform S into
a thorough set in two steps, the first of which is the following iterative process that computes a set S′
with |S′| = |S| by constructing a sequence S0, . . . , Sµ with S0 = S and Sµ = S′. For a node v ∈ V ,
let IE(v, S) := φShE (Sv) − φ
Sh
E (S) where Sv is the set obtained from S by increasing #S(v) by one.
While U (1,t)Si contains at least two nodes vh and vl with IE(vh, Si) ≥ IE(vl, Si), obtain Si+1 from Si by
increasing (resp. decreasing) #Si(vh) (resp. #Si(vl)) by one until one of the two nodes is not in U
(1,t)
Si
.
At the end, |U (1,t)Si | ≤ 1 and, moreover, the process terminates in polynomial time, since after at most t
iterations, one node is removed from U (1,t)Si .
Lemma 15. The set S′ satisfies φShE (S
′) ≥ φShE (S).
Proof. Let ∆i := φShE (Si+1) − φ
Sh
E (Si) for every i and d(x) :=
1
x(x+1) and note that d is decreasing in
x. We show that IE(vh, Si) ≥ IE(vl, Si) implies ∆i ≥ 0 and IE(vh, Si+1) ≥ IE(vl, Si+1). For a node
v ∈ V , letR(v) := {R ∈ RE : R∩{uv1, . . . , u
v
t } 6= ∅} be all Edge-RR-sets that contain the nodes from
V V corresponding to v. Then, we can rewrite IE(v, Si) and ∆i as
IE(v, Si) =
∑
R∈R(v)
d(|R \ Si|),
∆i =
∑
R∈R(vh)\R(vl)
d(|R \ Si|)−
∑
R∈R(vl)\R(vh)
d(|R \ Si|+ 1),
As d is decreasing, we have that
∆i ≥
∑
R∈R(vh)\R(vl)
d(|R \ Si|)−
∑
R∈R(vl)\R(vh)
d(|R \ Si|)
which equals IE(vh, Si)− IE(vl, Si). The latter is non-negative by choice of vh, vl. We turn to showing
IE(vh, Si+1) ≥ IE(vl, Si+1). We have that IE(vh, Si+1) =
∑
R∈R(vh)
d(|R \ Si+1|) equals
∑
R∈R(vh)\R(vl)
d(|R \ Si| − 1) +
∑
R∈R(vh)∩R(vl)
d(|R \ Si|),
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which is at least
∑
R∈R(vh)
d(|R \ Si|) = IE(vh, Si) as d is decreasing. Similarly, IE(vl, Si+1) =∑
R∈R(vl)
d(|R \ Si+1|) equals
∑
R∈R(vl)\R(vh)
d(|R \ Si|+ 1) +
∑
R∈R(vl)∩R(vh)
d(|R \ Si|),
which is at most
∑
R∈R(vl)
d(|R \Si|) = IE(vl, Si). Hence, IE(vh, Si+1) ≥ IE(vh, Si) ≥ IE(vh, Si) ≥
IE(vl, Si+1).
Lemma 16. The set S′ can be transformed into a thorough set S′′ with |S′′| ≤ |S′| and φShE (S
′′) ≥
φShE (S
′).
Proof. We start by treating a few trivial cases. (i) The set S′ is thorough. Then, we set S′′ := S′.
(ii) Property (1) holds for S′, but |E[US′ ]| = 0 and (iii) #S′(v) < t for all nodes v ∈ US′ . Recall that
|U
(1,t)
S′ | ≤ 1 by construction of S
′. Hence, (iii) implies that for all nodes v ∈ US′ but one, #S′(v) = 1.
In both cases (ii) and (iii), φShE (S
′) ≤ ℓ|E|/(t+2), as |R\S′| ≥ t+1 for each of the ℓ|E| Edge-RR-sets
R. Thus, by choosing any edge e = {v, v′} and setting S′′ := {uvi , u
v′
i : i ∈ [t]} we obtain a thorough
set with |S′′| ≤ |S′| and φShE (S
′′) ≥ ℓ/2 ≥ ℓ|E|/(t + 2) ≥ φShE (S
′).
If none of (i)-(iii) hold, we can order the nodes in US′ such that there exists an index r ∈ [|US′ |] such
that #S′(vi) = t for i ∈ [1, r − 1], #S′(vr) ∈ [1, t), and #S′(vi) = 1 for i ∈ [r + 1, |US′ |]. Recall
that k = kt, thus
∑|US′ |
i=r #S′(vi) is a (non-trivial) multiple of t. We conclude by distinguishing two
more cases. If vr is adjacent to one of {vi}i∈[r−1], we construct S
′′ from S′ by setting #S′(vr) = t and
#S′(vi) = 0 for all i ∈ [r + 1, |US′ |]. Otherwise, we find an adjacent node vq ∈ V \ {vi}i∈[r−1] (by
connectivity of G such node exists) and construct S′′ from S′ by setting #S′(vq) = t and #S′(vi) = 0
for all i ∈ [r, |US′ |].
In both cases S′′ is thorough and |S′′| ≤ |S′|. It remains to show φShE (S
′′) ≥ φShE (S
′). Indeed, in
the first (resp. second) case vr (resp. vq) is in the neighborhood of {vi}i∈[r−1]. By setting #S′(vr) (resp.
#S′(vq)) to t, there exist ℓ Edge-RR-sets R such that |R \ S′′| = 1/2. The total increase of φShE on these
RR-sets is at least ℓ/6 = ℓ/2− ℓ/3. Conversely, the decrease resulting from setting #S′(vi) = 0 for all
i ∈ [r + 1, |US′ |] (resp. for all i ∈ [r, |US′ |]) is at most ℓ|E|/(t + 1), since for each of the Edge-RR-sets
R that intersect {vi}i∈[r+1,|US′ |] (resp. {vi}i∈[r,|US′ |]), it holds that |R \ S
′| ≥ t. As ℓ/6 ≥ ℓ|E|/(t + 1),
this concludes the proof.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have formalized the problem of determining a set of k nodes in a social network maximizing an
influence-based Group Shapley centrality measure. Assuming common computational complexity con-
jectures, we have obtained strong hardness of approximation results for the problem at hand in this paper.
For instance, this problem cannot be approximated within 1/no(1) under the Gap Exponential Time Hy-
pothesis. On the other hand, we showed that a greedy algorithm achieves a factor of 1−1/ek − ǫ for any
ǫ > 0, yielding an interesting result when k is small.
Several directions for future work are conceivable. First, it would be worth investigating an algorithm
with an approximation ratio which is sublinear in the number of nodes of the social network. Second,
specific properties of the social network could allow more positive approximation results, as, for in-
stance, the connectivity of the graph has a direct impact on the size of the generated reverse reachable
sets. Hence, restricting this parameter could have an impact on the complexity of the problem from an
approximation viewpoint. Third, it would be interesting to adapt our work to other generalized semival-
ues as, for instance, the Group Banzhaf value [MKF07]. Lastly, properly engineering and testing the
approximation algorithm designed in this paper would be an interesting and complementary work.
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